A DEFINIÇÃO DO ZERO EM FREGE: O COMPROMISSO DO PLATONISMO FREGEANO COM A “ETERNIDADE” DE BOLZANO

In this article I try to show how Frege’s Platonism is related to the notion of Bolzano’s eternity. Understood as the complete range of time-variation, Bolzano’s eternity gives us a interesting instrument to conceive what is an eternal object: an object is said eternal if it is unchangeable through the flow of time. In that sense, Frege’s definition of zero uses tacitly such notion as long as zero is defined as the “number that belongs to a concept” whose extension is unchangeable in each possible word (such worlds conceived as instants situated at Bolzalno’s Eternity). That’s why we can infer that Platonism, on Frege’s view, may assume that abstract objects are not necessarily outside space and time, but are eternals, in the bolzanian sense.