A justificação da punição em Adam Smith: expressivismo e rabilitacionismo

The present research investigates the problem of the justification of punishment, more specifically the justification of the quantity and quality of punishment, as developed in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. To this end, I start from the assumption that the canonical interpretation of Smith’s proposal views it in a limited manner, that is, as a purely retributivist model, which, in turn, obscures relevant aspects of the complex normative architecture present in the work. I seek to demonstrate that Smith’s conception of punishment articulates elements that go beyond retributivism and consequentialism, namely expressivist and rehabilitationist concepts, thereby rendering his theory a hybrid model of the justification of punishment. To this end, I employ as a research method a theoretical and conceptual analysis of Smith’s work in dialogue with contemporary literature on theories of punishment, especially expressivism (Feinberg, 1970) and rehabilitationism (Hampton, 1984). I argue that, for the philosopher, the expressive function of punishment plays a central role, serving as the basis both for assessing the proportionality of punishment and for its end, namely the rehabilitation of the agent. As a result, I seek to highlight the contemporary relevance of Smith’s theory by offering normative criteria capable of overcoming the limitations of classical theories of the justification of punishment.