A liberdade do ser em Leibniz

In this paper we intend to verify the way in which Leibniz establishes a notion of liberty able to do not contradict the conception of a world in which all events are previously determined. Therefore, we are going to examine the way in which Leibniz can dissolve the opposition between determination and contingency of the events by means of notion of being as action. Furthermore, we are going to indicate aspects in which the Leibnizian project is opposed to the Cartesian dualism of substances and intends to overcome its dilemmas related both to Physics, in consequence of the complete passivity of res extensa, and to Metaphysics, above all in the aspects that res cogitans appears as a kind of denial of res extensa. Such a denial will imply the notion of will as pure arbitrariness, which rejects its regulation by any principle, and it will establish reason as an instrument of arbitrary will