- Autor
- Celi Hirata
- Revista
- Cadernos Espinosanos
- Edição
- 44
- Ano
- 2021
- DOI
- 10.11606/issn.2447-9012.espinosa.2021.181939
- Páginas
- 39-59
- Idioma
- pt-BR
Hobbes gives unprecedented importance to voluntary action, inasmuch as he maintains that the source of every obligation is a voluntary act of those that oblige themselves, given that all humans are naturally free and equal and that there are no natural obligations. On the one hand, Hobbes displaces the discussion about voluntary action and broadensthe conception of what can be considered so in relation to the tradition that goes back to Aristotle, since for him an action made out of fear is as voluntary as one performed due to some apetite. On the other hand, Hobbes limits voluntary actions to those actions that aim at the good of the agent — it is absolutely impossible that one would act contrary to her or his apparent good. In this article I intend to explore these aspects of the theory of voluntary action in Hobbes and indicate how these positions are accentuated in Leviathan.
