CARNAP, QUINE E O EMPIRISMO SEM DOGMAS

In this article we analyze the dispute between Rudolf Carnap and Willard van Orman Quine over empiricism focusing on the discussion of the so-called two dogmas of empiricism. In detail, Carnap and Quine are two leading figures in the 20th century Philosophy of Science and although they were close friends Quine was one of Carnap's greatest critics. In this enterprise Quine attributed two dogmas to the Carnapian work, namely, the so-called analytic-synthetic distinction's dogma and reductionism's dogma. Notwithstanding, this Carnap's dogmatic image was perpetuated so as to constitute a standard portrayal of Carnap's work within the Philosophy of Science. Opossing to Quine's interpretation, in this article we defend that Carnap's empiricism is not dogmatic, being alien to the dogmas atributed by Quine. Therefore, we argue that far from disagreeing on central aspects of empiricism, Carnap and Quine are in agreement on decisive points regarding the science's empiricist conception. In such a way that the main divergence between the authors is not found in empiricism per se but in their respective proposals for the Philosophy of Science itself.