Artigo
Ver fonte original- Autor
- Alexander Miller, Ali Hossein Khani
- Revista
- Revista de Filosofia Aurora
- Edição
- 27 / 40
- Ano
- 2015
- DOI
- 10.7213/aurora.27.040.AO01
- Páginas
- 265-276
- Idioma
- pt
2015Alexander Miller, Ali Hossein Khani. Davidson’s antirealism?. Revista de Filosofia Aurora, v. 27, n. 40, p. 265-276, 2015.1
Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland’s argument is a failure.