Artigo
Ver fonte original- Autor
- Barbara Botter
- Revista
- Journal of Ancient Philosophy
- Ano
- 2010
- DOI
- 10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v4i2p1-21
- Páginas
- 1-21
- Idioma
- pt
2010Barbara Botter. Individuo e Individuale in Aristotele. Journal of Ancient Philosophy, p. 1-21, 2010.1
This is a translation into Italian, accompanied by a brief commentary of chapter 2 of Aristotle’s Categories. In this text Aristotle presents the distinction between individual substances such as Socrates or Bucephalus and their species and genera as the distinction between primary (prw=tai) and secondary (deu/terai) substances (2a11-19). This distinction, in turn, is a distinction between substances that are particulars and substances that are universals. In the Categories Aristotle defines a primary substance as that which is neither said of nor in a subject (2a11–13). Being said of a subject and being in a subject are the only relations of metaphysical predication Aristotle recognizes in the Categories.
