Intersubjetividade e transindividualidade a partir de Leibniz e Espinosa

One of the greatest persistent misunderstanding around leibnizian philosophy is to think it as a sort of spinozism. Likewise, every attempt to show Leibniz and Spinoza as opposed to each other do not surpass the hegelian interpretation, according to which both philosophies are seen as antagonism between universality and individuality. Our aim is, on the contrary, to contrast one philosopher to another in respect to the matter of individuality and their relations to the XXth Century thinking: on the one hand, the husserlian intersubjectivity as the philosophical continuation of the Monadology; on the other hand, the simondnian concept of transindividuality, which upon the developments of Balibar turns the spinozian thought possible to be continued in contemporaneity. We intend to show the distance that keep both systems away one from another by means of an interpretation that do not simply repeat the old hegelian refrain.