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Juízo e opinião em Hannah Arendt

Yara Frateschi

Autor
Yara Frateschi
Revista
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade
Edição
24 / 1
Ano
2019
DOI
10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v24i1p35-65
Páginas
35-65
Idioma
pt
2019Yara Frateschi. Juízo e opinião em Hannah Arendt. Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade, v. 24, n. 1, p. 35-65, 2019.2

The first part of this paper reconstructs the history of political philosophy as narrated by Hannah Arendt, starting with some of her main characters: Platão, Hegel, and Marx. Despite relating to different contexts, problems and events, these philosophers carry a common trait: the avoidance of politics and the hostility to human pluralism. I intend to demonstrate that, for Arendt, the possibility of a renewed political philosophy depends on this exercise of subjecting Western political philosophy to a radical criticism. The second part analyses the philosophical solutions presented by Arendt in an attempt of reconciliation between philosophy and politics regarding two central themes that are intertwined: the formation of judgment and opinion. The dialogic and intersubjective formation of opinion (which Arendt formulates with reference to Socrates) and the representative thinking (that she formulates referring to Kant) are, in my interpretation, two of the most potent moments of her work, capable of providing precious insights for the ongoing updating of her political thought.