Linguistic Pyrrhonism: Self-Destruction, Dogmatic Assertions, and Skeptical Expressions

Usually, in the context of linguistic skepticism, the focus is on interrogating the capacity of language to mirror reality. My starting point is to explore a position that has radically questioned the ability of language to faithfully represent reality and postulated that philosophy is only possible as a critique of language. Fritz Mauthner assumed a linguistic-epistemological skepticism, according to which language is a source of deception and superstitions. My aim is not a detailed analysis of Mauthner’s philosophy, but rather an attempt to answer the question: Is it possible to establish the relationship between philosophy and language starting from a skeptical philosophy that is not radical and negative? To defend the idea of a non-radical and actively skeptical approach, I will review the main ancient sources of Greek Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus. My main purpose is not exegetical; I will take only those elements that enable me to defend the coherence of a Pyrrhonian philosophy without implying its self-destruction. I consider that Sextus Empiricus’ explorations of language, especially with regard to the reflection on the practice of philosophy as distinct from dogmatic assertions, allow me to present a viable and updatable sceptical philosophical proposal.