Notas sobre a concepção hobbesiana das relações do desejo e da razão com o tempo

The aim of this paper is to assess how Hobbes conceives the link between the human desire and the divisions of time. This analytical interest shall be understood as an effort to determine whether and how the philosopher attributes practical preference either to the present, or to the past or to the future, or, alternatively, whether and how he maintains neutrality regarding these options. The development of the analysis shows that advancement in the elucidation of this point depends crucially on Hobbes’ theory of the rationality of human behavior. Still, the attention to the relationship between action, rationality and time is not enough to secure a correct and global understanding of the matter, which requires the consideration of several others doctrinaire aspects of Hobbes’ theory, namely (i) his metaphysical conception of time, human life and the passions which enliven it; (ii) his theory of signs, names and language and the connection of them to our capacity of calculation and, last but not least, (iii) his idea of human happiness. From the articulate survey of all these different points of Hobbesian theory the paper concludes by showing that by means of the distinction between real and apparent good, the philosopher is able to sustain that, in spite of the shortsightness of our vision caused by the force of our passions, reason not only rends us able to calculate the action of causes and effects, but provides also our capacity to anticipate at least the near future consequences of our actions. Given this rational power of prediction, human individuals may keep in control their propensity to concede priority to what is present and, correlatively, make the consideration of future a guiding device for the accomplishment of their lives.