Os sentidos da ''determinação'' em Espinosa: afirmação, negação e constituição do finito

Qis study has as main objective an analysis of the concept of determination in Spinoza’s philosophy. Historically, Spinoza’s thought was assimilated to an acosmist philosophy, that is, a philosophy that denies the reality of finite things in a world where only God or substance would be real. This interpretation is consolidated with the Hegelian considerations in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy and in the Science of Logic, in which Hegel reads the entire Spinozist system through the "omnis determinatio est negatio" principle. First, our study presents the contemporary consequences of this Hegelian reading; then we analyze the Hegelian interpretation and some contributions of Deleuze regarding the concept of determination in Spinoza; and, finally, we analyze in the Spinoza’s text the role that the concept of determination plays and how it distances itself from the established Hegelian reading framework that “omnis determinatio est negatio”.