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SOBRE A LIBERDADE DA VONTADE: OBJEÇÕES DE HANNAH ARENDT À KANT

Elizabete Olinda Guerra

Autor
Elizabete Olinda Guerra
Revista
Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia
Edição
34
Ano
2011
DOI
10.15210/dissertatio.v34i0.8707
Páginas
349-366
Idioma
pt
2011Elizabete Olinda Guerra. SOBRE A LIBERDADE DA VONTADE: OBJEÇÕES DE HANNAH ARENDT À KANT. Revista Dissertatio de Filosofia, v. 34, p. 349-366, 2011.2

The study aims to explore the objections that Arendt addresses to Kant regarding the question of free will. Arendt sees the will as being the source of action, capable of bringing something new to the world that cannot be explained by a chain of causality, as suggested by Kant in his Third Antinomy. Yet contrary to Kantian thought, Arendt defends the thesis that the will is its own sake, or not is a will, it is not possible to consider it only a tool of practical reason.