THE DYNAMICS OF DE SE THOUGHTS

THE OVERALL AIM OF THIS WORK IS TO SHOW THAT WE NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DYNAMICS OF DE SE OR I-THOUGHTS (OR ELSE, THOUGHTS USUALLY EXPRESSED BY THE USE OF THE FIRST-PERSON PRONOUN) WITHIN THE BROADER PICTURE OF A DYNAMIST THEORY OF MENTAL ACTS – OF THE KIND ADVOCATED BY DOKIC 2001. I ARGUE THAT THE MOVE IS NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO DEAL WITH THE SO-CALLED “PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE DYNAMICS” IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE ACCOUNT BE ABLE TO CAPTURE THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF DE SE THOUGHTS AND RELATED ATTITUDES. THE DOCTORAL DISSERTATION IS DIVIDED INTO FOUR MAIN PARTS. IN CHAPTER ONE I REVIEW THE ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE CLAIM THAT DE SE THOUGHTS ARE SPECIAL AND IRREDUCIBLE TO OTHER KINDS OF THOUGHTS – IN PARTICULAR, DE RE AND DE DICTO. CHAPTER TWO TACKLES THE ISSUE OF COGNITIVE DYNAMICS AS ORIGINALLY PUT BY KAPLAN (1989) AND DISCUSSES THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT APPLIES TO DE SE THOUGHTS QUA INDEXICAL THOUGHTS. CHAPTER THREE CONSIDERS SOME OF THE OBJECTIONS RAISED BY DE SE SKEPTICS (NOTABLY, CAPPELEN & DEVER 2013) AGAINST THE VIEW THAT DE SE AND ESSENTIAL INDEXICALITY ON THE WHOLE ARE DEEP AND INTERESTING PHENOMENA AND TRIES TO ANSWER THEM. CHAPTER 4 SHOWS THAT DE SE THOUGHTS EXHIBIT FEATURES NOT CAPTURED BY A THEORY OF INDEXICALS. HOWEVER, GIVEN THAT AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR DYNAMICS IS STILL NEEDED, I POINT TOWARD THE POSSIBILITY OF BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM FORMULATED BY KAPLAN FOR INDEXICAL THOUGHTS. IF THE PROBLEM OF COGNITIVE DYNAMICS, AS I ARGUE, OUTSTRIPS INDEXICAL THOUGHTS AND CONCERNS THE UNFOLDING OF ALL INTENTIONAL STATES OVER TIME, ONE MIGHT WANT TO REFORMULATE IT AS A PROBLEM OF INTERNAL (MENTAL) CONTINUITY. I CONCLUDE THAT A STUDY OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DE SE THINKINGS ARE ENTERTAINED OVER TIME AMOUNTS TO ELABORATING A (NEO-LOCKEAN) THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.