THOMAS REID, O MÉTODO DE FILOSOFAR E A REJEIÇÃO DO CETICISMO

In this study we attempt to describe and to analyze an aspect of Thomas Reid’s (1710-1796) criticism to skepticism. Substantially, the core of this atittude is his criticism to “the common theory of ideas”. A less explored part of his arguments, one that is the background of them, is Reid’s conception of the method of obtaining philosophical truths. One decisive aspect here is the reflection about adopting certain “rules of philosophising” according to Reid. The relevance of studing the concept of philosophical method in Reid can be shown by remembering that, in the whole construction of his theory about the sources of knowledge and the principles of common sense, the “rules” are apllied in a rigorous and uniform way. His method helps one to understand, moreover, the kind of rejection of skepticism in epistemology that Reid will be able to accomplish.