Universalizing as a Moral Demand

Kant's Categorical Imperative is commonly criticized as being empty, i.e., devoid of content, and therefore unable to generate any concrete duties. More specifically, the criticism is that the imperative rules out (a) too much as being morally forbidden in one respect, (b) too little in another, and (c) that it rules out maxims for the wrong reasons. In this paper I shallargue that the Categorical Imperative expresses a recognizably moral idea, and consider how it can be used reliably to generateconcrete duties. My claim is that the Categorical Imperative expresses the demand of fairness: One should not make an exception for oneself in the sense that one should not regard oneself as being something better. I shall argue that the main objections against the imperative can be answered if one asks the question: Do I (1) try to make an exception for myself (2) to a rule that I regard to beobjectively necessary?