A discreta antinomia da razão pura prática de Kant na Metafísica dos costumes

IN THE FIRST PART OF THIS PAPER I PRESENT AN OUTLINE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN FREEDOM, MORALS, AND WORLD IN KANT. IN THE SECOND PART I DISCUSS THE EXAMPLES OF CHRISTIAN WOLFF AND CHRISTIAN AUGUST CRUSIUS AS TWO MODERN VERSIONS OF MORAL INDIFFERENTISMUS. IN THE THIRD PART I ADVANCE THE IDEA THAT THE MORAL DUTY CONCEPTION MADE EXPLICIT BY KANT IN THE 1780S AND 1790S PRESUPPOSES HUMAN FREEDOM TO CHOOSE AMONG AN ACTION FROM DUTY, AN ACTION CONFORMING TO DUTY, AND ONE AGAINST DUTY. IN THE FOURTH AND LAST PART I TRY TO SHOW THAT KANT’S CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF LIBERTAS INDIFFERENTIAE IN THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS DOES NOT CONTRADICT HIS IDEA THAT FROM THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW,MEN MAY AND MUST DETERMINE THEMSELVES FREELY TO ACTION. THIS INTERPRETATION CERTAINLY LEADS TO A DISCRETE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON, ALTHOUGH KANT HIMSELF DOES NOT USE THIS EXPRESSION.