A ESPECIFICIDADE DOS AFETOS DIRECIONADOS A OUTROS SERES AFETIVOS NO LIVRO III DA ÉTICA DE ESPINOSA

The book iii of Spinoza’s Ethics is dedicated to the definition of affections. Within this definition the other plays a very important role, even if, initially, it seems to be absent. Spinoza will begin his definition by speaking of affections directed to things and not necessarily to oth-er affective subjects. However, this does not mean that the other is not important to Spinoza’s theory, on the contrary, in proposition 21 of this book it appears, bringing new elements to the theory of affections and, mainly, pointing to a double-way , showing us that if, on the one hand, interpersonal relationships can be an affection of love, on the other hand, hate will be present, that is, this relationship can be both harmonious and conflicting. This is exactly the path we would like to illuminate in this article, explaining how the entrance of the other in Spinoza’s theory of affections introduces new nuances, new paths, new possibilities.