A existência real só pode ser provada pela existência real? A crítica de Locke contra a prova a priori cartesiana

In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (iv.x.7), John Locke registered a brief appreciation of the Cartesian a priori proof, stating that it would be, taken separately, an imperfect way of approaching the question of the existence of God. However, in a two-page manuscript dated 1696, he considered this proof inconclusive, since it could be used by both theists and atheists, leaving the question unfinished. Considering the scarcity of Lockean studies dealing with this manuscript, this paper proposes an interpretation of Lockean criticism of the Cartesian a priori proof, in order to verify if the English philosopher changed his opinion. The analysis of the text in question shows that Locke has not changed his mind significantly, because his conclusions registered in the manuscript are based on the rejection of innate ideas and immutable essences, in accordance with book I of the Essay. Additionally, his criticisms have a probable Thomistic background in the objections of Johannes Caterus.