De lo uno a lo múltiple: un aspecto de la relaboración hegeliana de la deducción de las categorías

This article’s aim is to show why Hegel considers to have solved two tasks that Kantian transcendental philosophy tried to accomplish, but could not due to its presuppositions: the metaphysical deduction and the transcendental deduction of the categories. First, I offer textual evidence to show how Hegel reinterprets the epistemological problem of a categorical deduction as the old metaphysical problem of the transition from unity to multiplicity. I enumerate the scientific requirements that a deduction of the categories must satisfy from the Hegelian point of view. Secondly, I expose the errors that Hegel attributes to Kant in both deductions, but always in light of its relation to the problem of the one and the many. Finally, I show why Hegel claims to have solved the Kantian task through the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic, which correspond to the transcendental deduction and the metaphysical deduction, respectively.