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Descartes e a rejeição da loucura enquanto argumento na primeira Meditação

Jonathan Alvarenga

Autor
Jonathan Alvarenga
Revista
Cadernos Espinosanos
Edição
46
Ano
2022
DOI
10.11606/issn.2447-9012.espinosa.2022.194585
Páginas
83-104
Idioma
pt-BR
2022Jonathan Alvarenga. Descartes e a rejeição da loucura enquanto argumento na primeira Meditação. Cadernos Espinosanos, n. 46, p. 83-104, 2022.2

In this paper we will discuss the insertion, the nature and the problematic of the rejection of madness as an argument in the First Meditation. To do so, we analyze the place, textually speaking, in which this rejection is set. In a second step, we will move on to dialogue with other authors who have already made interpretations about madness in Descartes. With this, we will be able to have a vast panorama of already formulated theses on the theme at issue here, in addition to understanding from which point of view interpreters have analyzed this element in Descartes’ text. Finally, we will present our interpretation, in which we will defend the physiological origin of madness, which, besides being the reason why the French philosopher rejects it as an argument in his text, is also the main reason why even an individual said to be mad could not reject the truth of the Cogito and the whole chain of reasons that follows it.