EL PERSPECTIVISMO EN LOS NUEVOS ENSAYOS SOBRE EL ENTENDIMIENTO HUMANO DE LEIBNIZ

This article is intended to analyze the perspectivistic conception of knowledge, as Leibniz presents it in his New Essays, in order to show that this conception is one of the aspects that make the originality of this philosopher in rationalistic Enlightenment. It shall be argued that this conception is based on two theses, the first of which is that Leibniz claims that the human knowledge is essentially perspectivistic, though this does not prevents him of claiming, against skepticism, that in each case the different perspectives present a different piece of knowledge of one and the same world. The second thesis is that, in order to this perspective to be able to be considered as rational and to provide wisdom, it is required that it recognizes itself as such in a reflexive way, i.e., as a partial and confused knowledge of a meaningful reality.