NOTITIA INTUITIVA, NOTITIA ABSTRATIVA E HABITUS NA TEORIA DO CONHECIMENTO DE GUILHERME DE OCKHAM

The theory of knowledge developed by Guilherme de Ockham in the 14th Century brings an important distinction between two levels of cognition: intuitive knowledge and abstract knowledge. Intuitive knowledge or notitia intuitiva has a causal relationship with the objects of the extramental world: objects are the cause of intuitive knowledge. This knowledge is that by which one can affirm that something exists or does not exist; it plays a central role in Ockhamian epistemology because it is highlighted as the basis of all knowledge. Abstractive knowledge, or notitia abstrativa, in turn, refers to the intelligible knowledge of sensitive objects that prescinds from the existence or non-existence of the object. Although all knowledge derives from intuitive knowledge, abstract knowledge is not immediately formed from notitia intuitiva. In this regard, our aim in this communication is to show how the passage from intuitive knowledge to abstract knowledge occurs through the habitus theory developed by Ockham. The background of this discussion is the essential notion that the stages involved in the cognitive process of Venerabilis Inceptor, that is, both intuitive knowledge and abstract knowledge are mental acts, so that the mental act in this model is not only the starting point of intellectual operations but also the final product: the concept. Thus, we will present how the aforementioned notions are articulated in Ockhamist cognitive theory.