O consenso original em John Rawls: um ideal moral para uma sociedade democrática

John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has reoriented western philosophic thought,starting a new period of reflection on justice. Designed so as to offer “one” theory, thiswork does not present a dogmatic purpose; however, it does propose principles of justice,resulting from a hypothetical original agreement, to constitute what it calls “justiceas fairness”, characterized by the foundation of the rules of “fair” in the institutions.Through the “veil of ignorance” imposed to men in their “original position”, Rawlsmakes the design of such principles the result of a rational common sense among individuals,trying to achieve a moral ideal that works as an alternative for the utilitarian doctrineand as the basis for a fair democratic society. The importance of Rawls’s completework can be assessed by the great attention and comments it has received in the academicworld, becoming responsible for the rebirth of discussions related to fundamentalissues concerning ethics and political philosophy. This has not prevented criticism to theauthor’s thinking from arising. The paper aims demonstrate that the vehement disagreementused by Rawls’s critics when attacking the argument of original sense decreases theimportance of his theory