Voltar para Artigos
Artigos

Ser uma pessoa, ser alguém. Os limites do institucionalismo hegeliano

Catherine Colliot-Thélène

Autor
Catherine Colliot-Thélène
Revista
Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade
Edição
19 / 1
Ano
2014
DOI
10.11606/issn.2318-9800.v19i1p35-61
Páginas
35-61
Idioma
pt
2014Catherine Colliot-Thélène. Ser uma pessoa, ser alguém. Os limites do institucionalismo hegeliano. Cadernos de Filosofia Alemã: Crítica e Modernidade, v. 19, n. 1, p. 35-61, 2014.2

It’s generally accepted that Hegel’s political philosophy is institucionalist to the extent that he is not satisfied with justifying the necessity of a political body and exposes its complex articulations with care and precision. While some authors, like Axel Honneth, for example, consider his institucionalism excessive, I think, otherwise, that Hegel’s interest for the concretude of institutions shows the force of his political philosophy. I argue that we can find in Principles of the Philosophy of Right, in two different levels, the traces of a discrete reflection on the limits of the institutionalizable: that of abstract right, object of the first section, and that of the ethical life, which occupies the second one.