Sobre o escopo cognitivo da aisthêsis no argumento final da primeira parte do Teeteto

The goal of this paper is to examine the cognitive limits of aisthêsis in 184-6 of Plato’s Theaetetus. The options are: (i) aisthêsis as ‘bare sensation’ and (ii) aisthêsis as ‘perceptual judgment’. I argue that Plato ignores the tension between these two alternatives because he is describing the whole process of perception as containing both. My focus is the text at 184-5, but first I make some preliminary comments, from a synoptic perspective, about what Plato is doing in the context of the argument. After that, I move on the text, offering translations and interpretations of the relevant parts. I also discuss some of Cornford and Cooper’s ideas about Theaetetus 184-6.