Sobre os Animais: A Visão da Kant sobre o Auto-Engano e sua Relevância para a Defesa do Bem-Estar Animal

In recent decades, the deconstruction of the anthropocentric paradigm has placed issues such as animal exploitation at the heart of modern ethical and meta-ethical debates. This topic has also been the focus of attention within Kantianism. In light of the fundamental differences  between humans and animals and the impossibility of assigning direct duties to animals posed by Kant's theory, making his practical philosophy useful for the defense of animal welfare seems an impossible task, other things being equal. Added to this difficulty is the criticism that a theory based on universal principles and individual duties may be inadequate to deal with animal welfare under cultural and situational considerations. By addressing these challenges, I aim to show that Kant's practical philosophy provides valuable resources for animal welfare advocacy. In this spirit, I contend that, though limited, Kant's account of self-deception is a promising way to bridge animal welfare alongside the ethos of Kant's moral theory.